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The domain remains Pending DNS

JetEmail verifies a domain only when its assigned mailto: address appears in the rua tag at _dmarc.your-domain. Check the public record:
Then confirm:
  • The record begins with v=DMARC1
  • It contains the exact address shown under DMARC → Domains → Setup
  • The RUA value includes the mailto: prefix
  • Multiple RUA destinations are separated with commas
  • Only one DMARC TXT record is published at that hostname
  • Your DNS provider did not append the domain twice
  • The record has propagated through public DNS
Correct:
Incorrect:

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The domain is verified but has no reports

Verification means DNS is ready; it does not cause a report to be generated. Check that:
  • Mail using the domain has reached providers that send aggregate DMARC reports
  • At least 24–48 hours have passed since the DNS change and qualifying traffic
  • A subdomain has not published its own DMARC record without the JetEmail RUA destination
  • The domain in the dashboard is the parent of the domain shown in the report
Not every receiver participates, and reporting schedules vary. Low-volume domains may receive reports irregularly.

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The dashboard shows an unexpected source

Do not immediately classify the source as abuse. First check:
  • Marketing, helpdesk, billing, CRM, survey, and monitoring platforms
  • A recently replaced mail provider that still has active traffic
  • Forwarding services and mailing lists
  • Internal systems, website forms, appliances, and cloud applications
  • The source IP, DKIM domains, SPF domains, and visible From domains in source detail
If the source is legitimate, configure aligned DKIM and an aligned SPF return path with that provider. If it is not legitimate, an enforced DMARC policy can ask receivers to quarantine or reject it after authorized sources are clean.

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DMARC pass is low

Open the affected source and compare its authentication paths:
  • DKIM low, SPF healthy: verify the provider’s DKIM record, selector, signing status, and d= signing domain alignment
  • SPF low, DKIM healthy: verify the envelope sender or custom return path and its SPF authorization
  • Both low: confirm the system is authorized and configure at least one aligned path before increasing enforcement
Forwarding often breaks SPF because the forwarding server is not listed in the original sender’s SPF record. A surviving aligned DKIM signature can still let the message pass DMARC.

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Failures show a delivered disposition

This can be expected when:
  • The domain policy is p=none
  • The pct value applies enforcement to only a portion of failures
  • A receiver applies a local policy override
  • The receiver chooses different local handling
Open the individual report and inspect its published policy and policy override fields.

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A recent policy change is not visible

The dashboard’s latest policy comes from received aggregate reports, not a live DNS lookup. Wait for a receiver to observe the new record and send its next report.

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Reports stopped after removing a domain

Removing a monitored domain disables its assigned reporting address. Add the domain again to generate a new address, publish that new destination in every applicable DMARC record, and verify DNS.

Review setup from the beginning

Follow the domain and DNS setup flow again.